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Krystyna Wilkoszewska* 
Remarks On Richard Shusterman‘s Pragmatist Aesthetics 
Owing largely to his influential work on pragmatist aesthetics and somaesthetics Rich-
ard Shusterman is one of the most renowned aestheticians in the world. The release of 
Pragmatist Aesthetics in 1992 greatly influenced the scholarly landscape; judging by the 
outpouring of translations, reviews, conference papers, MA and PhD theses written on re-
lated topics, indeed, one might say that the book inaugurated a new chapter in aesthetics. 
Shusterman‘s training as an analytic philosopher, and prior association with an analytic ori-
entation in aesthetics, undoubtedly added to the book‘s appeal.  
Shusterman is not the only philosopher to make a turn from the analytic to the pragma-
tist. Still, he is the only one to do so so radically, on such scale, and within the aesthetic 
domain. In Pragmatist Aesthetics he openly admits that his vision was largely inspired by 
the writings of John Dewey. Nonetheless, eight years later, in the preface to his book‘s se-
cond edition, the claim that ―pragmatist aesthetics began with Dewey‖ seems too bold for 
Shusterman. He points to the early contributions of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Alain 
Locke, whose works were more or less directly known to Dewey; Dewey nonetheless omits 
mentioning Emerson and Locke as his, quite potent (according toShusterman) sources of 
inspiration. Although it is impossible to deny aesthetic threads in the writings of the think-
ers mentioned above, still, in my opinion they are not proof enough to weaken Dewey‘s 
leading role as the founder of pragmatist aesthetics. 
Of the classical pragmatists, Dewey supplied the foundations for pragmatist aesthetics. 
His Art as Experience was published in 1934, yet for a number of reasons remained unno-
ticed during his lifetime. Firstly, pragmatism itself was at the time rather unpopular in Eu-
rope. Secondly, Dewey was no aesthetician, and his ―philosophy of aesthetics‖ (his own 
term), returning art to real life and building fully on his own concept of experience, strongly 
opposed any acknowledged continental notions (such as the autonomy of the work of art or 
the uniqueness of an aesthetic experience). Dewey‘s aesthetic thought was continued on 
American soil, especially after his death in 1952, by followers foreshadowed by a dynami-
cally developing analytic philosophy and aesthetics. Particularly the efforts of John 
McDermott, as well as Thomas Alexander and others, grouped in SAAP, are not to be un-
derestimated. Within their works they not only strived to reconstruct Dewey‘s original ide-
as, but also to develop them, uncovering their hidden potential in emerging fields such as 
ecology, technology or urban design. Particularly important is McDermott‘s book The Cul-
ture of Experience (1976), which uses the basic assumptions of Dewey‘s (and James‘) phi-
losophy of experience to show and diagnose the changes taking place in culture since the 
1960s. These were changes of great proportions and radicalism, and when used for Dew-
eyen-based aesthetic examination, they proved to be a most effective instrument, leading to 
conclusions that later emerged as highly accurate and significant. By way of example, we 
might mention here the role of touch and the whole sensory apparatus, as well as aesthetic 
sensibility, urban counsciousness, operativeness of environmental and contextual terms and 
a general return to everyday practices while discovering their aesthetic dimension. By tak-
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ing advantage of an anti-fundamentalistic and anti-dualistic approach, McDermott‘s book 
constitutes a big step in the development of pragmatist aesthetics.
1
 Meanwhile in his pref-
ace to Pragmatist Aesthetics Shusterman writes: ―Pragmatist aesthetics began with John 
Dewey – and almost ended there‖ and ―the philosophical influence of his aesthetic theory 
was very short-lived. Pragmatist aesthetics was soon eclipsed and rejected by analytic aes-
thetics…‖(xvi). The words that follow (three lines later) may awake controversy: ―This is 
not to deny important contributions by contemporary pragmatists to certain aesthetic issues 
– for example, Rorty on the ethical role of literature, and Margolis and Fish on interpreta-
tion‖. Indeed, narrowing down contemporary pragmatist thinkers to post-analytic philoso-
phers searching for inspiration in pragmatism seems a limiting perspective. 
In his article on Bernstein, Roberto Frega stresses the still-evident tension between the 
philosophy of language and the philosophy of experience.
2
 Some, like Rorty, approaching 
pragmatism via analytic philosophy and postmodernism failed to acknowledge the im-
portance of experience. Shusterman‘s progression also has its specificity, visible in extracts 
from his works. The author admits: ―Pragmatism was not taught to me in Jerusalem or Ox-
ford; nor did I teach it in the Negev. Philosophy there meant analytic philosophy, and aes-
thetics analytic aesthetics. Pragmatism emerged for me as a philosophical horizon only 
when I returned to America in 1985…‖.3 This was the time of so-called neopragmatism in 
the States, with which Shusterman seems to have come in contact. In his article bearing the 
significant title ―The End of the Aesthetic Experience‖ Shusterman names (apart from 
Dewey) Beardsley, Goodman and Danto (as well as Margolis and Rorty) as ―the leading 
figures of the aesthetic tradition‖, who contributed to his own views on the subject. He 
adds: ―While Dewey celebrated aesthetic experience, making it the very centre of his phi-
losophy of art, Danto virtually shuns the concept…‖.4 His tense and dramatic intellectual 
transformation finally leads him to writing Pragmatist Aesthetics, where Shusterman defi-
nitely opts for the philosophy of experience. 
A similar dramaturgy might be witnessed on the subject of interpretation. On his arrival 
at Temple, Shusterman encountered Joseph Margolis‘ concept of interpretation. He took 
part in discussions organized by the Institute on Interpretation, which shaped his under-
standing of interpretation. In ―Pragmatist Aesthetics‖, one of the chapters is dedicated to the 
topic of ―Pragmatism and Interpretation‖, another bears the title ―Beneath Interpretation‖. 
Indeed, almost one fifth of the entire work is dedicated to the problem of interpretation.  
Pragmatist Aesthetics was translated into Polish in 1998 with omission, on the author‘s 
request, of the chapter ―Pragmatism and Interpretation‖. In his preface to the Polish edition 
the author justified this decision as follows: ―…this translation, however more complete 
than any of the seven preceding it, does not contain one of the chapters present in the Eng-
lish original. It seemed too long, too technical to me, as well as containing too much inter-
nal tensions of pragmatists of the time…‖. The omission of the chapter, however, led to 
half of the preface being dedicated to remarks on interpretation.  
                                                          
1
 John S. Smith in the Foreword to McDermott‘s book The Culture of Experience wrote of the influence Dew-
ey's Art as Experience had on McDermott's thought: 'He finds there ideas essential for understanding present di-
lemmas in culture and for reconstructing affective values which grow out of actual experience and are in no need 
of imposition from without'. 
2
 R. Frega, ―Richard Bernstein and the challenges of the broadened pragmatism‖, European Journal of Prag-
matism and American Philosophy, vol. 3, no 2, 2011. 
3
 R. Shusterman, Preface to Pragmatist Aesthetics. Living Beauty, Rethinking Art.Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc. 2000 p. xvi, xvii 
4
 R. Shusterman, The End of Aesthetic Experience. In: Performing Life. Aesthetic Alternatives for the Ends of 
Art. Cornell University Press 2000 p. 15. 
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I could not assess whether the chapter was also omitted in other translations. I do not 
want to overestimate the importance of the Polish edition, but only to refer to it in making a 
more general point. The removal of the chapter may have a deeper importance. I believe 
that stressing the topic of interpretation in a work on pragmatist aesthetics is somehow mis-
leading, given that the problem of interpretation is not one of the major issues of an aesthet-
ics constructed on pragmatism (with its centralnotion of experience). Shusterman seems to 
be aware of this, yet it is not clear from which moment onwards. We are led to ask: (1) Was 
Shusterman already aware of this when writing Pragmatist Aesthetics and so decided to ad-
dress his book to the American reader, and especially to analytic thinkers, taking into ac-
count their interest in the problem of interpretation?or (2) did he become aware years later 
(preparing the book for translation) that the problem of interpretation was not an integral 
part ofpragmatist aesthetics? This latter interpretation would prove that in a sense the author 
gradually freed himself from the burden of the tradition he was trained in.  
In Art and Experience Dewey does not use the term ―interpretation‖ at all. Shusterman 
introduces a whole chapter on interpretation to prove, as he himself writes, the value of 
pragmatism to both the analytic, as well as deconstructionist traditions – though this value 
is of a different kind. A pragmatist interpretation enables one to avoid extremes: the exist-
ence of an objective meaning that interpretation is only meant to discover, on the one hand, 
and the denial of such prior meaning (stripping the work of its own identity and leaving it 
open to a plurality of interpretations arising from contextually dependent linguisticgames) 
on the other. 
I must admit I do not fully accept the strategy adopted by the author. Despite the fact 
that during the writing of Pragmatist Aesthetics analytic and deconstructionist orientations 
were dominant, this does not explain why regard for them had to be included in the con-
struction of pragmatist aesthetics. The Deweyan concept of experience no doubt carries a 
potential that could inspire (also on the question on interpretation) the orientations Shus-
terman points to. Instead of considering the problem of interpretation in detail, within 
―pragmatist aesthetics‖ it would be more helpful to present all aspects and consequences of 
the pragmatist concept of experience. 
Although the term ―interpretation‖ hardly appears in Art and Experience, the term ―‗in-
teraction‖ may be found on nearly every page, as a fundamental characteristic of experi-
ence. Reconstruction is a form of interaction, which may take on an interpretative charac-
ter.Both reconstruction and interpretation provoke a mutual subject-object transformation. 
In explaining the merit of pragmatist interpretation, Shusterman defines it as no so much 
discovering an existing sense but rather as giving sense. I am sceptical of this approach; in-
terpreting is not giving, but merely co-shaping meanings. In an interaction of interpretative 
experience the subject is not fully in control, since the object resists. This renders the inter-
action a correlation of subject-object tensions, resulting in the transformation of subject and 
object, making them defined. Still, the author claims that the freedom of the subject is lim-
ited through the cultural education we receive, which makes us interpret works of art in 
specific, conventional ways. I want to stress once more - the way interaction takes its 
course and the layers of meaning it activates in the subject depend on the object and vice 
versa - what the subject discovers in the object depends on consecutive phases of an ongo-
ing experience. Such experience is different each time, and so are its effects. It is even pos-
sible for the work of art‘s power to impel the interpreter into resigning his habits, or the 
subject‘spower of habit and convention to block the works innovative character. To con-
clude, I will consider Shusterman‘s opinions in this context to be still determined by under-
standing interpretative experience as subject‘s experience. 
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In the second edition of Pragmatist Aesthetics (2000) the chapter on interpretation was 
not removed, and the newly added chapter, entitled ―Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Pro-
posal‖ (similarly to the 1997 Practicing Philosophy. Pragmatism and the Philosophical 
Life) traces and develops somatic and sensual aspects of aesthetic experience present in 
Dewey‘s writings. In his preface to the second edition, the author addresses the reception 
his book received internationally, trying to counter the critical opinions received to this 
date. Amongst the themes discussed, the question of interpretation did not arise. This leads 
us to think that the relation of pragmatism and interpretation either did not cause any con-
troversy, or the attempt to direct the interest of analytic and deconstructionist philosophy to 
pragmatism in this field has gone unnoticed. Be that as it may, the discussion over the book 
was dominated by doubts concerning the chapter on rap music, or, more precisely, the atti-
tude of the author towards popular art. This was quite unfortunate for the book‘s reception, 
in my opinion, for the debate on rap foreshadowed important theses reshaping aesthetics 
according to pragmatist thought, which rap only served to exemplify. Instead, an attempt at 
attaching value to pop art resulted in excessive criticism, and the real value of Shusterman‘s 
book (consisting in the construction of a model of pragmatist aesthetics) was not sufficient-
ly appreciated. 
The author felt obliged to respond and explain the ongoing misunderstanding, devoting 
most of the preface to the second edition to popular artas well, an issue that does not seem 
the most essential to the project. This felt obligation proves how difficult it is for the prag-
matist option in aesthetics to break through the habit of dualistic thinking, embedded so 
deeply in our tradition. For all that the author seeks to explain in the preface to the second 
edition was already present in the first. What is more, to reach his readers more effectively, 
the author settles on a commonly accepted explanatory procedure (binary logics). This in 
turn, in my opinion, undermines the idea of pragmatist thinking. And so, in trying to legiti-
mize his benevolent outlook on popular art, and admitting it into the sphere of interest of 
contemporary aesthetics, to which pragmatist aesthetics complies due to its basic assump-
tions, the author succumbs to the temptation of using argumentation based on alternative of 
exclusion and that of inclusion. He does so to prove his deliberations were not aimed at ex-
clusion (either of pop art or high-brow art) but at including both. The word ―both‖ becomes 
essential. Even though the explanation will most probably serve its purpose, it is unfortu-
nate that the author was forced to defend a statement clearly based on pragmatist convic-
tions through the use of non-pragmatist language. Especially since his stance is fully clear 
even if not written into the dualistic matrix of opposites. Instead, conceptual oppositions are 
only hipostatized extremes of a polarised spectrum, where continuity and gradation, as well 
as the dynamics of change are impossible to apprehend within the framework of traditional 
logic. The demarcation between high-brow art and popular art loses its justification when 
faced with practice (and for pragmatist aesthetics this is essential).  
In practice both the work of art andthe work that aspires to be art don‘t just belong to 
the category of fine art orthe category ofpopular art. They are located somewhere in be-
tween these two, having certain aspects closer to one or the other. The same applies to deep 
pleasure, traditionally linked to aesthetic experience, and shallow hedonistic pleasure. Ar-
gumentation grounded on including such alternatives would not be fully adequate here (we 
have a choice between one option and the other, or of even both, but the division remains 
explicit). If we were to use concepts of continuity and gradation, they would portray real-
life cases more accurately, as the deepness of pleasure of experience is gradeable, some-
times, and sometimes only, adopting maximum polarisation.The fact of pragmatist aesthet-
ics preferring the sphere of ―between‖, as being closest to real-life praxis, over polar oppo-
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sitions, deserves constant stress. To put it in Deweyan terms, nouns are all too often 
hipostases of adjectives, and these can be graded. If we were to grasp art in an adjectival 
way, the dilemma of whether something is or isn‘t a work of art gives way to the dilemma 
to what extent it is a work of art. 
Twenty years have passed since the publication of Pragmatist Aesthetics. I wouldn‘t 
want to appear pessimistic, but I believe the understanding of this new approach, despite its 
popularity, has since progressed to just a small extent.
5
 This in turn means that the weari-
some toil of explaining and setting things straight must be continued. I am confident that 
excessive attention the author devotes to interpretation, and readers devote to popular art, 
have distorted or foreshadowed the essential shape and importance of the ―pragmatist aes-
thetics‖ project. A project contains as vital theses contrasting traditional aesthetics as theses 
concerning the aesthetic not standing in opposition to the practical, or the one stating that 
the task of aesthetic theory does not consist in describing the state of things but in meliorat-
ing human experience. 
Looking back at these matters of reception may seem obsolete. Still, the book‘s twenti-
eth anniversary may also become an occasion for reconsideration and retrospective. ―Prag-
matist Aesthetics‖ still remains the only work containing a full and comprehensive outline 
of what pragmatist aesthetics is. Perhaps it is time to consider a re-edition, unencumbered 
with the problems of the 80s, and presenting an updated vision of pragmatist aesthetics fit 
for the 21st century. 
 
                                                          
5 
That is not the case with somaesthetics. Although it does constitute a part of pragmatist aesthetics, it tends to 
function independently. I get the impression Shusterman is now mostly renowned as the creator of somaesthetics, 
and it is no surprise why. Pragmatist aesthetics introduced solutions that strongly disrupted conventional aesthetic 
thinking. Somaesthetics also seemed highly innovative, but (quite fortunately) it was born during the period of 
strong bodily fascination, present on various levels of human activity, reaching from philosophical theory to eve-
ryday practice. 
